Abstract: Strong evolutions are taking place for a modern distribution automation grid, with increased missions generating more and more reasons for cybersecurity. New control technologies with fast and wide area communication will require a modern approach addressing cyber security aspects, for design as well as for operation phases. This study describes the perspectives for the design of distribution automation architecture and devices addressing the cyber security aspect of the modern grid. It refers to topics such as data encryption, secured communication protocol implementation and routine security procedures to protect the distribution grid against cybersecurity attack and unintentional misuses.
† Scope itself is quite significant as purpose is to protect against ill-intended attackers but also unintentional misuse. † And all these points have to be addressed ensuring interoperability of components coming from various actors of different maturity levels, over a large diversity of device types, coping with consequent installed basis.
Therefore, modern distribution grid will address critical security issues, company process making security requirements a must for the various devices and infrastructure of the distribution grid.
It is then of outmost importance to be aware that cybersecurity will rely on devices and system features, but also strongly on process and people aspects, generating need for adequate services. This paper will focus on design aspects both at device and system level (Fig. 2) .
Please refer to [1] for considerations on process. 
Technical prevention measures to avoid blackout
The distribution automation architecture is made of thousands devices installed on large areas for underground and overhead electrical stations. First of all, distribution grid plays a key role on security and energy availability.
Typical risks could be unwanted operation of switchgear or setting change making transfer automatism not operational. Both of them could lead to blackout, by opening a line or not switching to backup source.
Compared to a pure information system, distribution grid faces numerous keypoints: † Access to each distribution RTU may prove difficult, often spread geographically, in isolated locations and visited only occasionally. † Communication channels are often of limited bandwidth. † Power consumption is critical, especially to ensure a good autonomy on batteries when main power is down to enable quick diagnosis and power restoration. † Devices mostly embed a single firmware with proven performances, ensuring functional safety missions.
The modern grid approach will as any information system identify key system vulnerabilities, assess the threats, evaluate the consequences of cyberattack and implement countermeasures or mitigation actions. However, solutions shall take into account the specificities listed before.
Part of prevention may be done at design time, be it at device or system level. More will be achieved by permanently monitoring vulnerability alerts and upgrading system accordingly. However, defining appropriate incident response management process and plan will prove necessary.
For doing so modern distribution systems will leverage technologies of all grid components, from RTUs to client devices, such as SCADA/DMS, a mobile maintenance actor or an Information System actor.
In [2] , IEC 27000-1 standard for complete view about classical problematics to be solved.
Basic design policies will typically include: † Robust design with clear interfaces and data check. † Access control based on roles, with limited access rights per user depending on its assigned roles. † Closing any unused com protocol ports. † Logging and monitoring of security related events. † Secured protocols implementing authentication and data encryption (SSH, Https over TLS etc.) † Testing against ill-intended penetration attack (Fig. 3 ).
Special focus shall be put on Web applications. Implementation of similar protections on messaging protocols will depend on interoperability constraints and state-of-the-art and develop over time.
In order to maintain the system prevention level and react on alerts, system components will also provide necessary features to support system upgrade such as † Easy firmware upgrade or patching, checking files integrity and robust to abort. † Back-up and restore facilities, for managing configuration data and firmware. † Means to manage user accounts from a central point to ensure consistency.
Robust design
Robust design with well-defined interfaces and data check is fundamental. For example, it is the key to: † Avoid penetration by letting attackers alter product behaviour by introducing wrong data in exchanges. † Enable to close com ports not used in a given configuration so reducing again the possibility for attackers to find entry doors (this may be defined through static rules depending on the configuration choices).
Role base access control (RBAC)
RBAC is at the core of the measures at device level, limiting the probability of misuses like unwanted setting change which may change the behaviour of system like fault detection, conditions to start a transfer automatism and so on Every user is limited to the access rights related to its role every access is logged in the security log, enabling to discover attack attempts (Fig. 4) .
Efficient firmware upgrade requirement
Providing ways to upgrade the firmware remotely, e.g. through webserver or SSH commands to ensure some automation of deployment will enable to deploy countermeasures when new vulnerabilities are found. Devices will protect themselves in case of abort with possibility to restart on previous firmware version. Then there is no need to visit each distribution substation individually.
Firmware upgrade has however to be executed under full responsibility and control of the utility, from within its private secured Information System (Fig. 5) .
Secured protocols
Usage of secured protocols implementing authentication and data encryption is fully necessary to secure Web Applications and file accesses, as they may be clear open doors to intruders once the Utility Information System is penetrated.
It was more disputable for messaging protocols within systems dedicated to electrical industrial domain requiring a specific encoding. Nevertheless, securing also this communication channel becomes more and more valid. Usage of these protocols in a secured version as defined in IEC62351 standards over IPSEC or TLS will deploy progressively, when corresponding protocol stacks will be made available and included in both SCADA's and RTUs.
Backup and restore
Ability to provide backup and restore facilities of device configuration and settings both on external devices and local copies ease and secure changes and firmware upgrades, enabling to return easily to validated configurations. It also enables for incident response to check if settings have been modified against reference version and reload them in case of doubt (Fig. 6 ).
System architecture first
At system level, architecture definition is of course a key step, e.g. separating or not the different information flows and subsystems. Consistent interfaces have to be specified in details.
Thorough analysis has to be made to implement barriers and countermeasures at relevant levels, avoiding to overload every system component with unrealistic features and constraints. This is especially relevant for distribution automation, considering the number of distributed devices and global cost of the architecture compared to classical information systems.
We have to imagine utility managing hundreds of RTUs in their system! Solutions shall prove efficient and realistic to cope with platform prices, bandwidth usage and consumption constraints.
For example, typically RBAC policy has to be supported at RTU level to restrict operation access at process level.
At the contrary, it would be counterproductive to integrate firewall in RTU. Such barrier makes sense only at relevant interfaces in the system, typically to insulate Electrical Distribution process part from Information System and extranet accesses.
So definition of addressed scope is always a must when considering an actual installation deployment.
3 Large impact on utilities and other actors: be future ready Impacts on the different actors are quite broad to ensure an actual cybersecurity management. Some typical but not exhaustive key points directly related to the technical part are presented hereafter.
Be ready for significant investments
Too many control devices in use on today's grid do not have the bandwidth, processors and capacity to be upgraded in order to apply state of the art cybersecurity features. They will have to be replaced. † This will require at manufacturer level to provide new richer and robust devices, embedding relevant security features, together with associated tools and documentation. † This means for utilities be ready for progressive and cost significant upgrade of existing grid control system. † Contractors and system integrators shall ensure that proposed solutions are robust and consistent, providing adequate documentation to their customers for safely starting and operating the delivered subsystem. They shall pay express attention to interoperability aspects.
Need for global cybersecurity management policy
All actors shall become ready for key implementation steps: † Well identify system levels and subsystems. † Well identify responsibility perimeters. † Identify and manage related Interoperability requirements. † Take into account cybersecurity aspects for request for projects, selection of components and suppliers. † Implement system hardening at installation time, typically resetting default user accounts. † Archiving of configurations.
Efficient firmware upgrade deployment
A typical impact on utilities will be the need to upgrade installed basis at relevant pace or on critical events. This is a very significant change compared to common usages to stick to an already qualified version. It will also require definition of efficient and robust means and processes to achieve these upgrades. Impact is also quite large as what we know in our day-to-day life on personal computers, considering the fact that devices firmware's are not really designed for local patch management as on laptops operating systems.
Firmware upgrade has to executed under full responsibility and control of the utility, from within its private secured Information System.
Utility shall implement an offline test process based on its own configuration and application to approve any firmware updates that may need to be applied.
Also risks of impact on day-to-day operation and functional safety has to be taken into account.
How will utility manage all its users through time?
Constraints appear until end of life as, for example user accounts and access rights have to be managed, not putting at risk other system parts remaining active neither proving information on company's security data (e.g. many utilities have the requirement to remove access to systems within 48 h after employee departure).
Emerging implementation of known solution from IT world (e.g. tools using Radius servers) will enable to manage them from a central point ensuring consistency through whole system, provided sufficient bandwidth is available.
This means actors have to take into account all these elements for every new project starting from definition phase to end of life.
Of course very significant impacts also exist regarding process and people not addressed here like:
